This paper investigates the possibility of disposing of interaction between prover and verifier in a zero-knowledge proof if they share beforehand a short random string.
Past and present. Blum, Feldman, and Micali [B1FeMi] were the first to conceive that zero-knowledge proofs could be based on the above, simple ingredient, and proposed the name of noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs for them, and presented some noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs. De Santis, Micali, and Persiano [DeMiPel] improved on their results by using a weaker complexity assumption. The present paper summarizes and improves on both these results.
First, we contribute a crisper formalization of noninteractive zero-knowledge; second, we modify their algorithms and provide a full proof of correctness for them, thus removing a subtle bug (pointed out by Bellare) in some part of their argument.
1.2. Shared random strings and public coins. As we have said, we have prover and verifier share a common, random string. Actually, in our proof systems the verifier will not toss any secret coins at all. The idea of protocols with public randomness is not new. Protocols making use of public randomness were already known in the literature, both in a cryptographic and in a complexity-theoretic scenario. These protocols, however, were developed for quite different ends, and differ from our scenario in the way the coin tosses are made available.
Random beacons. In IRa3], Rabin presents the notion of a random beacon. This is a source broadcasting random bits at regular time intervals. He used this device for "achieving simultaneity" in contract signing.
Note, though, that sharing a common random string is a requirement weaker than having both parties access a random beacon (e.g., sharing the same Geiger counter).
In this latter case, in fact, all made coin tosses would be seen by both parties, but the future ones would still be unpredictable. By contrast, our model allows the prover to see in advance the outcome of all the coin tosses the verifier will ever make. That is, the zero-knowledgeness of our proofs does not depend on the secrecy or unpredictability of a but on the "well mixedness" of its bits! 2
The part that presented a problem in their argument was the one relative to "many-theorems," that is, the equivalent of our 6.
In 3 we define the notion of bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge; that is, the "single theorem" case.
In 4 we show that a special number-theoretic language L possesses a bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge proof. That is, if prover and verifier share a random string, then it is possible to prove, noninteractively and in zero-knowledge, that any single, sufficiently shorter x E L.
In 5, under the quadratic residuosity assumption, we prove that the "more general" language of 3SAT is in bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge.
Only in 6 do we show that, if deciding quadratic residuosity is hard, the prover can show in zero-knowledge membership in NP languages for any number of strings, each of arbitrary size, using the same randomly chosen string.
In 7 we will discuss some related work.
proofs.
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In 8 we will state an open problem that we would love to see solved.
2. Preliminaries.
2.1. Basic definitions. Notation. We denote by Af the set of natural numbers. If n E Af, by i n we denote the concatenation of n l's. We identify a binary string a with the integer x whose binary representation (with possible leading zeros) is a. By the expression Ixl we denote the length of x if x is a string, the length of the binary string representing x if x is an integer, the absolute value of x if x is a real number, or the cardinality of x if x is a set.
If a and T are binary strings, we denote their concatenation by either a o T or aT.
A language is a subset of {0, 1}*. If L is a language and k > 0, we set Lk {x L: Ixl _< k}. For variety of discourse, we may call "theorem" a string belonging to the language at hand. (A "false theorem" is a string outside L.) Models of computation. An algorithm is a Turing machine. An e]ficient algorithm is a probabilistic Turing machine running in expected polynomial time.
We emphasize the number of inputs received by an algorithm as follows. If algorithm A receives only one input, we write "A(.)"; if it receives two inputs, we write "A(-, .)" and so on. A sequence of probabilistic Turing machines {Tn}e is an efficient nonuniform algorithm if there exists a positive constant c such that, for all sufficiently large n, T halts in expected n c steps and the size of its program is less than or equal to nc.
We use efficient nonuniform algorithms to gain the power of using different Turing machines for different input lengths. For instance, T can be used for inputs of length n. The power of nonuniformity lies in the fact that each Turing machine in the sequence may have "wired-in" (i.e., properly encoded in its program) a small amount of special information about its own input length. 4 A random selector is a special (random) oracle. The oracle query consists of a pair of strings (s,S), where the second string encodes a finite set. Such a query is answered by the oracle with a randomly chosen element in the set S. If the oracle is asked the same query twice, it will return the same element. The role of the first entry in the query is to allow us, if so wanted, to make random an independent selection in a set 8. That is, if 8 is the same, and sl s2, then, in response to queries (sl, 8) and (s2, S), the oracle will return two elements from S, each randomly and independently selected.
A random selecting algorithm is a Turing machine with access to a random selector. Note that a random selecting algorithm is strictly more powerful than one with access to coin or random oracle. For instance, a random selecting algorithm can select with uniform probability one out of three elements. On the other hand, simulating independent coin flips is easy with a random selector: If Select is a random selector, to ensure the independence of bi, the ith coin flip, from all the other coin flips in a computation on input x, one can set bi Select(x i, {0, 1}).
Random selectors will simplify the description of our algorithms. In fact, we desire a prover in a noninteractive proof system to be "memoryless." That is, it needs not remember which theorems it proved in the past to find and prove the next theorem.
However, for zero-knowledge purposes, it will be much handier to keep track of some history, the history, that is, of previously made coin tosses. This will be crucial in 6. A random selector will, in fact, accomplish this record-keeping without having 1088 BLUM, DE SANTIS, MICALI, AND PERSIANO to consider provers "with history." As we shall point out, random selectors can be efficiently approximated, and thus only represent a conceptual tool.
Algorithms and probability spaces. If A(.) is a probabilistic algorithm, then for any input x, the notation A(x) refers to the probability space that assigns to the string a the probability that A, on input x, outputs a.
Following the notation of [GoMiRi] , if S is a probability space, then "x S" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element randomly selected according to S. If F is a finite set, then the notation "x F" denotes the algorithm which assigns to x an element selected according to the probability space whose sample space is F and uniform probability distribution on the sample points.
If p(.,-,...) is a predicate, the notation gr(x -S;y -T; p(x,y,...)) denotes the probability that p(x, y,...) will be true after the ordered execution of the algorithms x -S, y .... The notation {x S; y -T; (x, y,...)} denotes the probability space over {(x, y,...)} generated by the ordered execution of the algorithms x -S, y -T,....
Number theory. Quadratic
Residuosity. For each integer x > 0, the set of integers less than x and relatively prime to x form a group under multiplication modulo x denoted by Z. We say that y E Z is a quadratic residue modulo x if and only if there is a w E Z such that w 2 _= y mod x. If this is not the case, we call y a quadratic nonresidue modulo x. For compactness, we define the quadratic residuosity predicate as follows: Qx(Y) { 0 1 otherwise.if y is a quadratic residue modulo x, and FACT 2.1 (see for instance [NiZu] ). If yl, Y2 Z, then 1. Qx(Yl) Q(Y2) 0 Q(YlY2) 0.
1.
The quadratic residuosity predicate defines the following equivalence relation in Z: yl Y2 if and only if Q(yly2) 0. Thus, the quadratic residues modulo x form a x equivalence class. More generally, Fact 2.2 is immediately seen.
FACT 2.2. For any fixed y Z, the elements {yq mod x q is a quadratic residue modulo x} constitute a equivalence class that has the same cardinality as the class of quadratic residues.
The problem of deciding quadratic residuosity consists of evaluating the predicate Q. As we now see, this is easy when the modulus x is prime and appears to be hard FACT 2.4 ( [Ral] , [SoSt] ). There exists a polynomial-time algorithm TEST(., .) such that 1. if x is composite, TEST(x, r) =COMPOSITE for at least s 3of the strings r such that Irl-Ixl.
2. if x is prime, TEST(x, r) =PRIME for all r's. We say that the sequence (PI, hi),..., (Pn, hA) is the factorization of x if the pi's n h are distinct primes, the hi's are positive integers, and x-1-I=l pi While it is easy to test compositeness, no efficient algorithm is known for computing the factorization of a composite integer. In fact, the following assumption is consistent with our state of knowledge.
Factoring assumption. For each efficient nonuniform algorithm C (Cn}nnf, let pu G denote the probability that, on inputing an integer x product of two randomly selected primes of length n, Cn outputs--in some standard encoding--the factorization of x. (This probability is computed over all possible choices of the two primes and the internal coin tosses of CA.) Then for all positive constants d, and all sufficiently large n, pu G < n-d.
Often, computational problems relative to composite moduli are easy if their factorization is known. For example, this is the case for the problem of computing square roots modulo x. FACT 2.5 (see for instance [An] ). There exists an efficient algorithm that, given as inputs x, its prime factorization, and y, a quadratic residue modulo x, outputs a random square root of y modulo x. FACT 2.6 (IRa2] ). The problem of factoring composite integers is probabilistic polynomial-time reducible to the problem of extracting square roots modulo composite integers.
Another computational problem modulo x that is easy given the factorization of x is deciding quadratic residuosity. FACT 2.7 (see, for instance, [NiZu] ). y is a quadratic residue modulo x if and only if y is a quadratic residue modulo each of the prime divisors of x.
However, no efficient algorithm is known for deciding quadratic residuosity modulo composite numbers whose factorization is not given. Some help is provided by the Jacobi symbol, which extends the Legendre symbol to composite integers as follows. Let (Pl, hi),..., (p, hA) be the prime factorization of x, and y E Z. Then 5
Define j+l and j-i to be, respectively, the subsets of Z whose Jacobi symbol is +1 and -1. It can be immediately seen that if y E J-1, then it is not a quadratic residue modulo x, as it is not a quadratic residue modulo some prime pi dividing x. However, if y j+l, no efficient algorithm is known to compute Qx(y). Actually, the fastest way known consists of first factoring x and then computing Qx(y). This fact was first used in cryptography by Goldwasser and Micali [GoMil] . We will use it in this paper with respect to the following special moduli.
Blum integers. For n EAf, we define the set of Blum integers of size n, BL(n), as follows: x BL(n) if and only if x pq, where p and q are primes of length n, both congruent to 3 mod 4. These integers were first used for cryptographic purposes by [Bll] . Blum integers are easy to generate. By Fact 2.3 and the density of the primes congruent to 3 mod 4 (de la Vallee Poussin's extension of the prime number theorem [Sh] ), it is easy to prove the following.
FACT 2.8. There exists an efficient algorithm that, on input 1n, outputs the factorization of a randomly selected x BL(n).
This class of integers constitutes the hardest input for any known efficient factoring algorithm. Thus no efficient algorithm is known for deciding quadratic residuosity modulo Blum integers, which justifies the following.
Quadratic Residuosity Assumption (QRA). For each efficient nonuniform algorithm {Cn}ne, all positive constants d, and all sufficiently large n, Pr(x -BL(n); y j:l 1 n-d Cn(X,Y)--x(Y) < --That is, no efficient nonuniform algorithm can guess the value of the quadratic residuosity predicate substantially better than by random guessing.
It follows from Fact 2.7 and Euler's criterion that, if x is a Blum integer, -1 mod x is a quadratic nonresidue with Jacobi symbol +1. FACT 2.9. On input of a Blum integer x, it is easy to generate a random quadratic nonresidue in j+l: randomly select r Z and output -r 2 mod x. 3. Bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge proofs. A bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system is a special algorithm. Given as input a random string a and a single, sufficiently shorter theorem T, it outputs a second string that will convince (noninteractively and) in zero-knowledge that T is true for any verifier who has access to the same a. It is important in this process that a "brand new" random string is employed for each theorem. The word "bounded" refers to the fact that if the same a is used over and over again for convincing the verifier of the validity of many theorems, the produced noninteractive proofs may no longer be zero-knowledge. DEFINITION 3.1. Let A1 and A2 be Turing machines. We say that (A1,A.) is a sender-receiver pair if their computation on a common input x works as follows.
First, algorithm A, on input x, outputs a string m. Then, algorithm A2 computes on inputs x and m and outputs ACCEPT or REJECT. If (A, A2) is a sender-receiver pair, A is called the sender and A2 the receiver. The running time of both machines is calculated only in terms of the common input.
Thus m can be interpreted as a message sent by A1 to A2.
Notation. In our sender-receiver pairs, the output of the sender is described in.
terms of s "send instructions," where s depends solely on the input length. If "send v" is the ith such instruction, this is shorthand for "output (i, v)." Without explicitly saying it, the receiver always checks that for each 1,..., s, exactly one pair with first entry is received. If this is not the case, or if the second component of a pair is not of the right form (i.e., is not of the proper length, is a string rather than a set, etc.), the receiver immediately halts outputting REJECT. Thus if "send v" is the ith instruction of the sender, "check that v..." means "check that the second component of the pair whose first entry is i...." That is, the receiver parses without ambiguity the sender's output. DEFINITION 3.2. Let (Prover, Verifier) be a sender-receiver pair where Prover(., .) is random selecting and Verifier(.,., .) is polynomial time. We say that (Prover, Verifier) is a bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system (bounded noninteractive ZKPS) for the language L if there exists a positive constant c such that: We call Simulator the algorithm S. We define the class of languages Bounded-NIZK as follows:
Bounded-NIZK {L: L has a bounded noninteractive ZKPS}.
A sender-receiver pair (Prover, Verifier) is a bounded noninteractive proof system for the language L if there exists a positive constant c such that completeness and soundhess hold (such a c will be referred to as the constant of (Prover, Verifier)). We let bounded noninteractive P be the class of languages L having a bounded noninteractive proof system. We call the "common" random string a, input to both Prover and Verifier, the reference string. (Above, the common input is a and x.) Discussion. Proving and verifying. As usual, we do not care how difficult it is to prove a true theorem, but we do insist that verifying is always easy. Thus, we have chosen our prover as powerful as possible, though it cannot use its power to find "long" proofs, since the verifier is polynomial time (in the common input).
Arthur-Merlin games. It is immediately seen that the notion of a bounded noninteractive proof system is equivalent to that of a two-move Arthur-Merlin Proof System [Ba] , [BaMo] . Thus, letting AM2 denote the class of languages accepted by a two-move Arthur-Merlin Proof System, we have Bounded-NIZK c_ AM2. Actually, as we shall prove in 5.5, this containment is an equality under a proper complexity assumption.
Deterministic verification. Note that our verifiers are defined to be deterministic.
Thus, if they want to perform some probabilistic computation, they are forced to use part of the reference string. A cheating prover may thus try to exploit this fact to his advantage.
Probability enhancement. As for the case of BPP algorithms and interactive proofs, the definition of completeness and soundness is independent of the constants 2 and In fact these (or other "bounded away") probabilities can be pumped up (and down) easily by repeating the proving process sufficiently many times, each using a distinct segment of a sufficiently longer reference string. This process is called "parallel composition." However, as noted by Micali, for the case of interactive zeroknowledge proofs, parallel composition may also enhance the amount of knowledge released! Indeed, zero-knowledge proofs do not appear to be closed under parallel composition. The reason for which straightforward parallel composition fails in the case of interactive zero-knowledge proofs is precisely that the interaction may be exploited in subtle ways by a "cheating verifier. ''6 One advantage of noninteractive zero-knowledge is exactly the fact that one does not have to worry about "cheating" verifiers" as is immediately seen, bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge is closed under parallel composition.
Completeness means that (after a sufficient enhancement) the probability of succeeding in proving a true theorem T is overwhelming. This is so even if T is selected after the string a has been chosen. More precisely, a simple counting argument shows that completeness is equivalent to the following: 11. Strong completeness. For all probabilistic algorithms Choose-in-L(.) that, on inputting an nO-bit string, return elements in Ln, and all sufficiently large n, A {0, 1}n ; x Choose-in-L(a);
Proof 2-Prover(a, x) Verifier(a, x, Proof) 1) > 1 2 -n That strong completeness holds can be seen by first using parallel composition so as 2 of completeness with 1 2 -2n and then noticing that to replace the probability 5 there are at most 2 theorems of length n.
Actually, completeness can be replaced by an even simpler property. Namely Proof. Furer et al. [FuGoMaSiZa] have proved that any AM2 language has an interactive proof system with perfect completeness. Now let (P, V) be a bounded noninteractive ZKPS for L for which completeness holds with overwhelming probability. Then modify P as follows. Whenever the proof generated by P is not accepted by the verifier (something that can be easily computed), as bounded noninteractive P-AM2, the new prover interprets the reference string as an Arthur move, and responds with a Merlin move so as to achieve perfect completeness. This extra step guarantees that the verifier will always be convinced (of a true theorem), and thus perfect completeness holds. It is immediately seen that soundness keeps on holding. Also, zero-knowledge keeps on holding: the extra step may be "dangerous," but it is performed only too rarely.
Soundness means that the probability of succeeding in proving a false theorem T is negligible. This still holds if T is chosen after a has been selected. More precisely, a simple counting argument shows that soundness is equivalent to 2. Strong soundness. For all probabilistic algorithms Adversary outputting pairs (x, Proof), where x Ln, and all sufficiently large n, Pr(a {0, 1}nO; (x, Proof) J-Adversary(a)" Verifier(a,x, Proof) 1) < 2 -n.
Zero-knowledge guarantees that the proof gives no knowledge but the validity of the theorem. All the verifier may see in our scenario, a and Proof, can be efficiently computed with essentially the same odds without "knowing how to prove T."
Note that in our scenario, the definition of zero-knowledge is simpler than the one in [GoMiRa] . As there is no interaction between verifier and prover, we do not have to worry about possible cheating by the verifier to obtain a "more interesting view."
That is, we can eliminate the quantification "V Verifier'' from the original definition of [GoMiRa] . Analogously to [GoMiRa] , we may define a bounded noninteractive proof system (Prover, Verifier) to be perfect zero-knowledge if the following more stringent condition holds:
3. Perfect zero-knowledge. There exists an efficient algorithm S such that for all
x E Ln and all sufficiently large n,
Thus the notion of perfect ZK is independent of the computing power of "the observer/distinguisher." While for completeness and soundness it is not important whether the true/false theorem is chosen before or after the reference string, this need not to be the case for zero-knowledge. It is actually important that the prover chooses the true theorem T he wants to prove independently of a. This, in practice, is not a restriction, since a does not have any special meaning. The sole purpose of a is to provide a common source of randomness, and thus it can be accessed only after the prover has chosen which theorem to prove, in which case the "independence" condition is automatically satisfied. Should the prover want to prove a statement "about" the reference string, there is no guarantee that no knowledge would be revealed, while there is still a guarantee that the statement cannot be false. 4. A bounded noninteractive ZKPS for a special language. DEFINITION 4.1. Set QT UnQT(n) and AfQT-unAfQT(n), where Qn(n) {(x,y) x e Regular(2), Ixl <_ n, and Qx(Y) 0} and AfQT(n) {(x, y) x e Regular(2), Ixl <_ n, y e j+l, and Qx(y) 1}.
If one restricts the modulo x in the definition of QT and AfQT to be a Blum integer, then the quadratic residuosity assumption states that it is hard to distinguish the languages QT and AfQ.
For x E Regular(2), QRx denotes the set {y[ (x,y) E QT} and NQR the set (x, e DEFINITION 4.2. If (x, y) AfQ:R and z Jx +1, we say that s Z is an (x, y)root of z if z s 2 mod x or zy s 2 mod x. (Note that only one of the two cases may apply.) If s is an (x, y)-root of z, we write s -('Y/.
In this section we prove that AfQT has a bounded noninteractive proof system that is perfect zero-knowledge. The Third, properties 1-3 of a bounded noninteractive ZKPS also hold. Completeness. We actually prove that strong completeness holds. This implies that the weaker property 1 also holds. If (x, y) E AfQ(n), then step B.1 is trivially passed.
Step B.2 is passed because of Fact 2.10. B.3 is passed with probability greater than 1 2-n. This can be argued as follows. For any fixed 5 Regular(2), the probability that TEST outputs PRIME on a single p is at most 8 5-, and thus (since the p's are independent) the probability that B.3 is not successfully passed is {5 n Since there are at most 2 x's such that (x, z) E AfQT(n) for some at most z, the probability that step B.3 is not successfully passed is at most 2n(-) n _ 2-n.
Finally, step B.4 is passed with probability i. In fact, as x Regular (2), by Fact 2.11, there are exactly 2 x equivalence classes in Jx +. That is, either p is a quadratic residue modulo x or p is in the same equivalence class as y, in which case yp is a quadratic residue.
Soundness. As for the completeness property, we actually prove that strong soundness holds.
First, observe that B stops at step B.0 only with negligible probability. Indeed, By the Chernoff bound for a fixed 5, the probability that p J+l is greater than .
(see [AnVa] and [ErSp] ) the probability that Pi j.+l for fewer than 3n of the indices is (for large n) less than 2-2n. Thus, the probability that there is an x for which B stops at step B.0 is at most 2n2 -2n 2-n.
Assume that (x,y) AfQT. Then, either (a) x Regular(2) but Qx(y) O, (2). For any fixed input (,) for which case (a) occurs, the probability that B.4 is successfully passed is at most 2TM. (In fact, B.4 is passed if and only if all pi's are quadratic residues modulo x.) Thus, the probability that step B.4 is passed, for any input for which case (a) occurs, is at most 2n2 -3n 2 -2n.
Consider now the case that (x, y) AfQT because of reason (b). Then either
In case (b.1), due to Fact 2.10, an odd x must be a perfect square which would be detected in step B.2. In case (b.2), x is a prime power which would be detected by step B.3. Let us now argue case (b.3). For any fixed (5, ) with 5 Regular(s), s >_ 3, the probability that step B.4 is successfully passed is at most 2-. (In fact, this would happen only if, for each pi j.+l either pi or py is a quadratic residue modulo 5. This happens with probability smaller than or equal to since, because of Fact 2.11, there are at least four x equivalence classes in J.+l .) Thus the probability that, for any input outside AfQT because of reason (b.3), step B.4 is successfully passed is at most 22n2 -3n 2 -n.
Zero-knowledge. Let us specify a (simulating) efficient algorithm M that, on input (x, y) AfQT, generates a random variable which no algorithm can distinguish from B's view on input (x, y) AfQ74.
Ms program
Input: (x, y) A/'Q(n).
1. Set Proofempty string.
Fori-lton 2
Randomly select an n-bit integer si, with possible leading O's.
If si Jx +1 then set Pi si.
else Toss a fair coin.
2 mod x and append si to Proof.
If HEAD set pi s If TAIL set pi y-si2 mod x and append si to Proof.
3. Set p-p pn2.
Output: (p, Proof). Now, let us prove that M is a good simulator for the view of B when interacting with prover n on input (x,y) AfQT. Actually, (A,B) is perfect zero-knowledge.
That is, the random variable output by M is the very same random variable seen by B (and thus the two random variables cannot be distinguished by any nonuniform algorithm, efficient or not). In fact, it can be easily seen that p is randomly distributed among the n3-bit long strings. Moreover, if Pi E j+l, the corresponding si is a random (x, y)-root of p. Thus s has the same probability of belonging to M's output as it has of being sent from prover A to verifier B on inputs (x, y) and p. [:] Note that the proof system (A, B) does not have perfect completeness; that is, there is a negligible probability that the prover, following the protocol, may not succeed in proving a true theorem. We can achieve perfect completeness and still retain perfect zero-knowledge at the expense of further complications which are not necessary in our context.
Robustness of the result. The above proof system is zero-knowledge if the reference string p is truly random. We may rightly ask what would happen if p is not truly randomly selected. Fortunately, we shall see that the poor randomness of p may perhaps weaken the zero-knowledgeness of our proof system, but not its completeness and soundness. In fact, all we require from p is that it contain a not too low percentage of quadratic residue and nonresidues modulo any integer in Regular(2) of a given length. The same remark applies to all proof systems of this paper. This robustness property is important, as we can never be sure of the quality of our natural sources of randomness.
5.
A bounded noninteractive ZKPS for 3SAT. In this section we exhibit a bounded noninteractive ZKPS for 3SAT. A boolean formula (I) 1 A 2 A... A in conjunctive normal form over the variables ul,''',uk, where each clause has three literals, is in the language 3SAT if it has a satisfying truth assignment t: {Ul,.", Uk} --{0, 1} (see [GaJo] for a more complete treatment). If e 3SAT, we say that (I) is 3-satisfiable.
The following definition was informally introduced in [B1FeMi] , but used in a quite different way. DEFINITION 5.1. For any positive integer x, define the relation x on j+l j+l j+ as follows:
(hi, a2, a3) x (bl, b2, b3) == ai x bi for 1, 2, 3. Let (al,a2, a3) (b,b2,b3 ). An (a,a2,a3)-root modulo x (more simply, an (al, a2, a3)-root, when the modulus x is clear from the context) of (b, b2, b3) is a triplet (sl, s2, s3) such that (s2 mod x, s mod x, s mod x) (abl mod x, a2b2 mod x, a353 mod x). If Q(b) Q(b2) Qx(b3) 0, a square root modulo x (more simply a square root, when the modulus x is clear from the context) of (bl, b2, b3) is a triplet (s, s2, s3) such that (s mod x, s mod x, s mod x) (b, b2, b3). From Fact 2.11, one can prove the following fact. We write (al, a2, a3) (b, b2, b3) when (al, a2, a3) is not equivalent to (b, b2, b3) . We now proceed s follows. In 5.1, we describe a sender-receiver pair (P, V). In 5.2, 5.3, nd 5.4 we will prove that (P, V) is a bounded nonintemctive ZKPS for 3SAT. 5.1. The sender-receiver pair (P,V). (2n) and, moreover, x e BL(n). T is a 2n4-bit long string." begin{Prove} 1. "Break T into members of j+l.,, Consider T aS the concatenation of n 3 2n-bit integers. If there are fewer than 33n 2 integers in J+l then stop. Else, let T ,..., T33n be the first 33n 2 integers belonging to J+l.
2. "Assign triplets of elements with Jacobi symbol +1 to clauses." Group the Ti'S in lln 2 triplets (T1, T2, T3) (T4, Th, T6),"" The first lln triplets are assigned to 1, the second lln triplets are assigned to 2, and so on. We refer to these pairs as the labeling of and to wj (ywj mod x) as the label of the literal uj (gj).
"Since y is a quadratic nonresidue, by Fact 2.1, yry is a quadratic nonresidue.
Therefore the label of a literal is a quadratic nonresidue if the literal is true under t."
Send the labeling of O.
4. "Prove that is satisfiable."
For each clause of do:
"Randomly select the verifying triplets." Let (c1,/31,3'1) be the labels of the three literals of .
Choose at random seven triplets (c2,/32,'Y2),.. ", (c8, C/s, 3'8) in j+l x j+l x J+l such that (a) (i,i,"i) x (Cj,j,'j) for 1 <_ < j _< 8, and (b) Q(c2)= Qx(/32)= Q('y2)-0.
Send (c1,/31, "yl ), , (c8,/3s, "y8). The triplets (c1,/1, '1),'" ", (C8,/8, /8) are the verifying triplets of . " We omit writing (al ,/1 , ,),..., (c8 ,/8 , 9,8 ) not to overburden our notation, hoping that clarity is maintained."
"Prove that (a2,/2, "2) is made of quadratic residues." Randomly choose and send (Sl, s2, s3), a square root of (c2,/2, /2). For each of the assigned triplets (Zl, z2, z3) of b, choose i, 1 _< _< 8, so that (zl, z2, z3) x (c,/, ). Randomly choose and send a (,/, /)root of (zl, z2, z3). end{Prove} Instructions for V. "V receives from P the auxiliary pair (x, y) and two strings Proof and Proof2." V.0. Compute n from p o T and verify that (I) 1 / 2 /k''" /k (n is a formula with n clauses over the variables u l, u2,..., Uk. x, y are 2n-bit integers. T is a 2n4-bit long string. Proof2 is a string." begin{Check_Prove} 1. "Verify that the assigned triplets are proper."
Consider T aS the concatenation of n 3 2n-bit integers. If there are fewer than 33n 2 integers in j+l stop and ACCEPT. Else, let -1,'", T33n be the first 33n 2 integers belonging to J+l.
"This happens with very low probability."
Group the -'s in lln 2 triplets (7"1, 7"2, "]'3)' (T4, T5, T6),"" The first lln triplets are assigned to 1, the second lln triplets are assigned to 2, and so on. Verify that they have been properly computed by P.
2. "Verify that (I) has a proper labeling."
For each variable uj, verify that the label of the literal j is equal to the label of the literal uj multiplied by y modulo x.
3. For each clause of (I) do:
3.1. Let (a,/, ?), 1,..., 8, be the verifying triplets of sent by P.
3.2. Verify that (cl,/1, ?) is formed by the labels of the three literals of .
3.3. Verify that (Sl, s2, s3) is a square root of (c2,/2, "2).
3.4. Verify that for each assigned triplet (zl,z2, z3) of , you received a ((i,/i, ?)-root of (zi,z2,z3), for some i, 1 _< _< 8. 4. If all the above verifications have been successfully made, return ACCEPT; otherwise return REJECT. end{Check_Prove} 5.2. (P,V) is a bounded noninteractive proof system for 3SAT. First, note that (P, V) is a sender-receiver pair. Further, all checks of V can be performed in polynomial time, since only simple algebraic computations modulo x and a scanning of the strings p and 7 are needed.
Completeness. The same reasoning done in Theorem 4.3 shows that the probability that V does not REJECT at step V.1 is overwhelming. Let us now consider step V.2. The verification of the proper labeling of (I) is always passed. Since t is a satisfying truth assignment for (I), each clause has at least one literal true under t. This implies that the label of contains at least one quadratic nonresidue. Because of this, and because there are eight x equivalence classes, P can compute eight verifying triplets satisfying properties (a) and (b). Moreover, since each x equivalent class contains a verifying triplet, each assigned triplet is equivalent to some (ci, i, and thus possesses an (ai,/i, 7i)-root. Therefore, if check V.1 is passed, so is check
Soundness. An honest prover chooses the pair (x, y) randomly. A cheating one, though, may choose this pair as function of the reference string. All arguments below thus have the following form. First, we compute the probability that the verifier can be mislead with a fixed pair, and show that this probability is suitably small. Then, we prove that, even summing up over all possible choices of pairs, we still obtain a small probability.
Assume that, in a computation with a cheating prover Provert, V accepts a formula (I) 3SAT. Then, one of the following three events must happen: (a) the pair (x, y) chosen by Prover' is not in AfQT(2n); (b) (x, y) E AfQT(2n), but Prover' stops at step P.1 in lrove; and (c) (x, y) E AfQT(2n), Prover' does not stop at step P.1 in Prove, but (I) is not 3-satisfiable. We shall prove that each of these events is very improbable. The probability that (a) occurs has already been computed in Theorem 4.3 and shown to be exponentially vanishing in n. Now, consider event (b). For each fixed 5 Regular(2),-2 <_ n, since each Ti has probability greater than or equal to 1 of being in J+l, we expect n3/8 such elements in j.+l_. By the Chernoff bound (see [AnVa] , [ErSp] ), the probability that no more than 33n 2 belong to J+ is, n for large n, at most e-Thus, the probability that there is an integer x such that case (b) occurs is, for large n, at most 22he--n2. Let us now consider event (c). If (c) occurs, then the following event (d) must also occur: at least 11n consecutive assigned triplets (Ti,Ti+,Ti+2) must belong to the union of seven equivalence classes. In fact, if (I) is not satisfiable, for every labeling of O, one of its clauses is labeled with a triplet of quadratic residues (else, all clauses would be satisfiable). Let be such a clause. Since verification step 3.3 must be passed, Prover must exhibit a square root of (a2,/2,/2), and thus this triplet is equivalent to 's label, (o1,/1,1). Thus, all verifying triplets of are contained in the union of at most seven equivalence classes. Since each (Ti, -i+l, 'i+2) is proved in step 3.4 to be x equivalent to one verifying triplet, then event (d) must be true. The probability of event (d) is at most 7n(0.93) n. Indeed, for each fixed 5 the probability that at least 11n assigned triplets belong to the union of 7 equivalence classes is less than 7n()ln; this can be explained as follows: is the probability that each triplet belongs to the union of seven fixed equivalence classes, there are 11n triplets, there are at most () 8 ways to choose seven classes out of eight, and there are n clauses altogether. Therefore, the probability that there exists an integer x such that case (d) occurs is at most 7 ln 7n(0.93) n. This concludes the proof of soundness.
22nTn() Remark. (P, V) can be modified in the same way as (A, B) was to achieve perfect completeness. This is the reason why the verifier in step 1 of Check_Prove accepts if there are fewer than 33n 2 integers in J+. Note also that the prover need not have infinite computing power. In fact, an efficient algorithm can perform all required computations provided that it has as an additional input the satisfying assignment for .
We show now that the proof system (P, V) is also zero-knowledge over 3SAT.
We first exhibit a simulator for V's view and then prove that it works. 5.3. The simulator. The following algorithm S, on input a formula E 3SAT (but not a satisfying assignment for (I,) generates a family of random variables that, under the QRA, no efficient nonuniform algorithm can distinguish from the view of V. Note that the view of Y consists of a quadruple (p o T, (X, y), Proof1, Proof2); thus, the task of the simulator is to produce a quadruple that cannot be distinguished, under the QRA, from a correct quadruple. Looking ahead, the two crucial points in the strategy of the simulator are: 1. To choose the auxiliary pair (x, y) so that x BL(n) but y is a quadratic residue modulo x.
2. To choose a portion of the reference string not at random. Rather, select it from among the strings that do not contain any quadratic nonresidue modulo xin j+l. This strategy is viable because the simulator can choose the reference string (which is instead fixed for the prover) and because it is hard to distinguish between random members of J+l and random quadratic residues modulo x.
For a clearer presentation, S's program has been broken down into procedures.
To give informal help in reading these procedures, we write z' for a value computed by the simulator, when we want to emphasize that this value is "fundamentally different" from the "corresponding" value z computed by the prover P, though an exponentially long computation may be required to determine this fact.
S's program
Input: a 3-satisfiable formula 1 A 2 A... A Cn over the variables Ul, u2, ..., Uk,  k<3n.
1. Randomly select two n-bit primes p, q _= 3 mod 4 and set x pq.
Randomly select r Z and set y'= r 2 mod x. "Call (x, y') the auxiliary pair."
2. Execute procedure Gen_p_and_Proof l(x, y') obtaining the strings p' and Proof1.
3. Generate a random 2n4-bit string T.
4. Execute procedure Gen_Proof2(, x, y',p, q, 7) obtaining the string Proof2. Output: (p' o T, (X, y'), Proof1, Proofs) Procedure Gen_p_and_Proof 1 (x, y) "This procedure is used both by the simulator S and, later on, by some probabilistic algorithm. In any call, x BL(n) and y J+l. When the procedure is called by the simulator S, y is a quadratic residue modulo x." begin{Gen_p_and_Proof 1} 1. Set Proof empty string.
Fori-lto4n 2
Randomly select a 2n-bit integer si, with possible leading O's. LEMMA 5.3. Define Space l(x, y) as the probability space generated by the output of (]en_p_emd_Proof 1 on input x, y. Then, for all x E BL(n) and y NQRx Spacel(x, y) {p {0, 1}su3; Proof1 P_Proofl(x, y, p)" (p, Proof1)}, where P_Proofl is P's procedure to compute Proof1 (i.e., step P.2).
Proof. Fix x BL(n) and y NQRx. It can easily be seen that the first component of Gen_p_and_Proof l's output is randomly distributed among the 8n3-bit long strings. Moreover, if pi j+l, the corresponding si is a random (x,y)-root of pi. Thus si has the same probability of belonging to Gen_p_ad_Proofl's output as it has of being sent, at step P.2, from prover P to verifier V on inputs (x,y) and p.
Procedure Gen_Proof2(O, x, y', p, q, T) "This procedure is used both by the simulator S and, later on, by some probabilistic algorithm. In any call, x BL(n) and yP QR. It returns a string Proof2 that 'proves' that the formula (I) 1 A 2 A... A Cn is 3-satisfiable using the string T and the pair (x, y) even without knowing any satisfying assignment for (I) ." begin{ en_Proo f 2 } 0. Set Proof2 empty string.
1. Consideras the concatenation of n 3 2n-bit integers. If there are fewer than 33n 2 integers in j+l, stop. Else, let 71,... 7"33n be the first 33n 2 integers belonging to J+l.
Group the T's in lln 2 triplets (T1, %, -3), (T4, T0, %),-... The first lln triplets are assigned to 1, the second l ln triplets are assigned to 2, and so on. 2. For each variable uj, randomly select wj NQR and label the literal uj with wj and the literal j with y wj mod x.
"Since y is a quadratic residue, all labels are quadratic nonresidues." Append the labeling of (I) to Proof2.
For each clause of (I) do:
Let al,/31, and 1 be the labels of the three literals of .T hus,
NQR.
Choose at random seven triplets (a2,/32,72),'" ", (as,/s, %) in j+l j+l j+l such that (a,, 7) x (aj,j, 7j), for 1 _< < j _< 8 and 0.
Append the triplets (al,/1,71),'" ", (as,/s, 78) as the verifying triplets of to Proof2. Randomly choose and append a square root of (a2, f12, 72) to Proof2.
For each of the assigned triplets (Zl,Z2, Z3) of , choose i, 1 _< _< 8, so that (Zl,Z2,Z3) (ai,fli,7i). Randomly choose and append an (hi, fli, 7i)-root of (zl, z2, z3) to Proof2. 4. Return(Proof2) end{en_Proof2}
LEMMA 5.4. Algorithm S is efficient. Proof. The main body and procedure Gen_p_androofl are computationally trivial. The first two steps of procedure Gen_Proof9. are also quite easy as, due to 1102 PLUM, DE SANTIS, MICALI, AND PERSIANO Fact 2.9, generating a random quadratic nonresidue in j:l is easy when x E BL.
Let us now see also that step 3 can always be completed, and efficiently as well.
Given that the first verifying triplet has been chosen to be composed by quadratic nonresidues in j+l and the second by quadratic residues, it is certainly possible to choose the other six verifying triplets so that all of them belong to eight distinct x equivalence classes. Moreover, given that the factorization of x is an available input, the remaining part of step 3 can be efficiently executed. Proof. All that is left to prove is that (P, V) satisfies the zero-knowledge condition.
We do this by showing that algorithm S of the previous section simulates the view of the verifier V. We proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists a positive constant d, an infinite subset Z c_ Af, a set {On}nE:y such that each O is a 3-satisfiable formula with n clauses, and an efficient nonuniform "distinguishing" algorithm {Dn},ez such that for all n E Z where Ps(n) Pr(8 -S(1n, On)" On( 8 1) and Py(n) Pr(s View(On): Dn(s) 1).
We derive a contradiction by showing an efficient nonuniform algorithm {Cn}nz violating the QRA. On input randomly chosen x BL(n) and y j+l, Cn constructs a string SAMPLE which is distributed according to o(1n, On) if y QRx, and according to View(On) if y e NQR. Thus, as the nonuniform algorithm {Dn}n:r is assumed to distinguish the two probability spaces, this is a violation of QRA.
The Algorithm Cn "Cn has "wired-in" a formula O n along with t, the lexicographically smaller satisfying truth assignment for On, a description of On, and the probabilities Ps(n) and Pv(n)."
Input: (x, y) such that x e BL(n) and y j:l. 3. Let jl,... ,j33n be the indices of the first 33n 2 si's belonging to J+.
If there are fewer than 33n 2 such integers set T s'"Sna and stop.
Else, set Ti si for all indices not in {jl,'", J33n }. 4. Group the ji's in lln 2 triplets (jl,j2,j3), (jn,j5,j6),"'. Assign the lln 2 triplets to the clauses in the following way: the first 11n triplets are assigned to the first clause, 1, the second 11n triplets are assigned to the second clause, :, and so on. 5. For each variable uj, randomly select vj E Z and assign the label wj to the literal uj and the label ywj mod x to the literal y, where 2 rood x if t(uj) 1, and wj -V;v modx ift(uj)=0.
Call (i) the labeling of (I). Append (I) to Proof2. 6. For each clause of (I) do:
Let -ya 2 mod x,-yb 2 mod x,-c 2 mod x be the label of the three literals of gb, and a, b, c previously computed values in Z.
"We consider only one case, not to overburden our notation. The other cases are treated similarly."
Randomly choose 21 elements al, b, Cl,..., aT, bT, c7 E Z, and construct the following eight triplets (-ya: mod x, -yb 2 mod x, -c 2 mod x) (a 2 mod x, b mod x, c mod x) (a mod x,-b22 mod x, c 2 mod x) (a mod x,-b] mod x,-c] mod x) (-a42 mod x, b42 mod x, c mod x) 2 2 2 (-as mod x, b 5 mod x,-c mod x) 2 2 Z (-a 6 mod x,-b 6 mod x, c mod x) 2 2 z (ya mod x, yb mod x,-c mod x).
Construct the eight verifying triplets of as follows. Set (, ill, "/1) (-ya 2 mod x,-yb 2 mod x,-c 2 mod x), (c2, f12, 3'2) (a21 mod x, b21 mod x, c mod x).
Randomly permute the remaining six triplets and assign them to Append (o1,/1, '1),''', (O8, f18, ")'8) to Proof2. Append the triplet (al, bl, Cl) to Proof: as a square root of (a2,/32, ")'2).
For each of the assigned indices (ll,l:,13) of , Randomly choose one of the eight verifying triplets, say, (ak,/3k, "yk).
Randomly choose Vl,V2,V3 Z and set Tll V21ak mod x, Tl2 V3k mod x, and 'ta v/k mod x.
1104
BLUM, DE SANTIS, MICALI, AND PERSIANO Compute and append to Proof2 (VlOk mod x, v2k mod x, v3k mod x) as an (k,/k, "k)-root of (T, T., TZ). Set T T "''Tn.
Return(T, Proof2). end {Samp ie__and_Proof 2 }
There is no question that {Cn}neI is an efficient nonuniform algorithm. Now let Space:2(On, t, x, y) be the probability space generated by the output of Sample_7_and_Proof2 on input On, t,x, y. Then, for all n E :Y and for all x BL(n), Space:2(On, t, x,  To see (,) , note that if y NQRx, then the label wj assigned to each literal uj by Cn is a random element selected from either NQRx or QR depending on whether t(uj) is true or false, respectively (this is the same computation performed by Prove).
If y QR, then the label wj of literal uj is always a random element selected from NQR (in the same way as Gen_Proof2 computes it). In both cases the label of is ywj mod x.
Regardless of the quadratic residuosity of y modulo x, for each clause of 0, the eight verifying triplets of computed by Cn are always selected at random among the triplets of elements in J+ that are pairwise not equivalent. The first triplet consists of the labels of the three literals of , and the second triplet is made of three quadratic residues.
The stringoutput by C is truly random (regardless of the quadratic residuosity of y modulo x). Indeed, eachis randomly selected from the 2n-bit long strings, and independently of the remaining 7j's.
Finally, for each clause and each of its assigned triplets (71,-2,n3) the corresponding (vlck mod x, V2k mod x, v3k mod x) is a random (ak,/k, k)-root of (7tl, Tt2, -t3)" This completes the proof of (,).
Since SAMPLE (po T,(x,y),Proofl,Proof2), because of (,) and because of Lemma 5.3, for randomly selected x BL(n) and y J+, SAMPLE is distributed as View(On) if y NQRx and as S(1n, On) if y QR. Given our assumption about the efficient nonuniform algorithm {Dn}neI, it is immediately seen that, for all n Pr(x -BL(n); y -j+l Cn(x,y) Q(y)) >_ 1/2+ 1/(2nd), which contradicts the QRA.
Remark. The reader is encouraged to verify that if the same reference string a and the same (x, y) are used by the prover to prove that two formulae and are 3-satisfiable, then "extra knowledge may leak," for instance, that there exist a satisfying assignment for and a satisfying assignment for for which the literal u in and the literal 2 in have the same truth value.
The moral is that one must be careful when using the same set-up, i.e., common reference string, and the same pair (x, y), to prove an "unlimited" number of formulae to be satisfiable. This is indeed the goal of 6. 5.5. Arthur-Merlin games and bounded noninteractive zero knowledge.
THEOREM 5.6. If 3SAT Bounded-NIZK, then Bounded-NIZK AM.
Proof. Since Bounded-NIZK C_ Bounded noninteractive P AM2, it only remains to show that AM2 C_ Bounded-NIZK. Let L E AM2. Then, there exist a positive constant c and a sender-receiver pair (Prover, Verifier) [FuGoMaSiZa] , the proof system (Prover, Verifier) enjoys perfect completeness. Define now the language L'-UnL'(n), where L'(n) {(r, x) lr --nc, x e Ln, and w, Iwl _< n such that Verifier(r, x, w) 1} and L and c are as above. Then x L if and only if (r, x) L'(n) for most he-bit strings r. 7 Moreover, L NP, thus there is a fixed polynomial-time computable reduction R such that (r, x) e L'(n) R(r, x) e 3SATb, where b > 0 is a fixed constant depending only on the reduction R.
We now describe a bounded noninteractive ZKPS (P, V) for L. On input x Ln and the reference stringr o a, where ]r] n and a has the proper length, P constructs the formula R(r,x) and, if it is 3-satisfiable, then runs the algorithm for the prover P of 5.1 with input and a, to prove that, indeed, q e 3SATnb. THEOREM 5.7. Under the QRA, Bounded-NIZK AM2. 6. Noninteractive zero-knowledge. We now want to capture the ability of giving noninteractive and zero-knowledge proofs of "many" theorems, using the same common reference string, in an "on-line manner." That is, each theorem can be proven independently of all previous and future theorems.
We will present our formal definition when the theorems to be proven are statements about 3-satisfiability. DEFINITION 6.1. Let (Prover, Verifier) be a sender-receiver pair, where Prover(., .) is random selecting and Verifier(.,., .) is polynomial time. We say that (Prover, Verifier) is a noninteractive zero-knowledge proof system (noninteractive ZKPS) if the following three conditions hold. A sender-receiver pair (Prover, Verifier) is a noninteractive proof system for 3SAT if completeness and soundness hold.
Discussion. First, note that we have set the probability of acceptance of true theorems to be 1, since 3SAT NP. Note also the generality of our definition as it handles any number of formulae of arbitrary size in completeness, soundness, and zero-knowledge. That is, every true theorem can be proven, no matter how long. Of course, longer theorems will have longer proofs. Since the verifier is polynomial-time in the length of the common input, it will have more time to verify that a longer formula is 3-satisfiable. Every false theorem, no matter how long, has negligible probability of being "successfully proved"; however, though the length of the proof grows with the length of the theorem, "negligible" is defined only as a function of the length of the reference string, s Finally, every theorem, no matter how long, possesses a zero-knowledge proof. Of course, a longer theorem will have a longer proof and thus the polynomial-time simulator will have more time to simulate the proofs. The zero-knowledgeness of the simulator's proofs holds only for a nonuniform "observer" bounded by the length of the reference string. 9 The definition of noninteractive ZKPS might be more general if perfect completeness is relaxed to completeness as in 3. In this case the adversary choosing algorithm
Choose-in-L should be given a and access to Prover's random selector.
6.1. The sender-receiver pair (P,V). In this subsection we describe a sender-receiver pair (P, V). P can prove in zero-knowledge the 3-satisfiability of any number of 3-satisfiable formulae with n clauses each. Later, we shall show how to use the same protocol to prove any number of formulae, each of arbitrary size.
Before going into a formal description of the proof system, we give an informal view of the protocol.
An informal look at (P,V).
Observation. A crucial observation that will be (implicitly) proved in this section is the following. If many certified auxiliary pairs (x, y) (x E BL and y NQRx) are available, one can use each (x, y) to prove in zero-knowledge that any single formula (I)(x,y) with n clauses is 3-satisfiable using the same random string -. For what we remarked in 5, the same T and the same auxiliary pair should not be used to prove the 3-satisfiability of two different formulae.
In the light of the above observation, we want to construct a mechanism to achieve the following two goals:
(1) Associating to each formula (I) an auxiliary pair (x , yO), of "bounded" size, so that, with overwhelming probability, different formulae are associated to different pairs.
(2) Certifying (x e, y), i.e., proving that x BL and y NQR.
The first goal could be achieved by using the random selector, but the problem of the certification remains. The current mechanism for certifying in zero-knowledge a single auxiliary pair (x, y) using p can be extended to handle "a few" more pairs, but not arbitrarily many. 1 Instead, we use a mechanism of recursive nature to simultaneously achieve (1) and (2).
Let us first describe this recursive mechanism for a prover "with memory." Such a prover can construct and store a binary tree of depth n. The left child of each node will also be denoted as the 0-child, and the right one as the l-child. Thus each node in the tree is labeled with a binary string of length at most n + 1. The root is labeled 0, and each other node is labeled with string describing the unique path from the root to it. Thus, for instance, the left child of the root has label 00 and rightmost leaf of the tree has label 01n. With each node (labeled) i, the prover stores a randomly selected auxiliary pair (x, y). The prover uses (x, y) for certifying auxiliary pairs of the children of node i, that is, (xio, Yio) and (xil, yil). The first auxiliary pair (x0, Y0) is certified using string p as in 4. For each i, the two pairs (XObl...bO,YObl...bO), (XOb...bl,YOb...bl), are certified together as in 5, using the same string T1. That is, consider the language L UnL(n), where L(n) {((Uo,Vo),(u,vl)) Uo,U e BL(n), v o e NQR o, v e NQRv}.
Then L NP. Thus, there exists a fixed polynomial-time computable function CR such that ((u 0, v0), (tl, Vl)) e L(n) ====v CR(uo, v0, ul, Vl) e 3SATan, where e is a fixed constant depending only on the reduction CR. More precisely, let T be a polynomial-time Turing machine such that x L if and only if there is a "witness" (string) w such that Iwl _< Ixl e and T(x, w) 1. Then, the formula is obtained by encoding the computation of T as in Cook's theorem, and then reducing it to a 3-satisfiable formula, as Cook suggested [Co] . A well-known property of this reduction is that to each "witness" w one can associate in polynomial time a satisfying assignment for .I n our case the witness consists of the primes in the factorizations of u o and u and their proof of primality. The proof (witness) of the primality of 10 Recall the way p is used. If pi QRz, a square root of pi mod x is given; if pi NQRz a square root of ypi mod x is given. In our simulation, however, all pi will be chosen in QRx. Thus, if we want to carry on the simulation for many pairs (xi, yi) we need to construct a p solely consisting of quadratic residues modulo x,x2,..., which appears very hard to do when the number of xi's grows large. Ob...b 3SATn, and we have observed (but not yet proved) that one can prove in zero-knowledge arbitrarily many theorems of size n given arbitrarily many independent certified pairs (x,y)'s. Since these pairs are randomly and independently selected, with overwhelming probability, each pair (xob...b, YOb...b) is used only once with T to prove Obl...bi 3SATn.
In sum, this mechanism provides each formula (I) with a certified auxiliary pair (x,y) that is uniquely determined from (I) and the reference string, though still random.
The prover we just described need not remember the labeled full binary tree; it can, in fact, (re)grow its branches as needed. It must, though, remember which auxiliary pairs it had associated with the nodes of the tree. In fact, if it does not keep track of these pairs, it may use the same auxiliary pair and the same reference string to prove different theorems, which may not be zero-knowledge. To avoid this, and to avoid "memory," the prover uses the random selector to associate a random pair with the node of the tree. Namely, on input a formula the prover chooses n bits bl b2 bn by querying the random selector with a pair whose first entry is and the reference string a poT1 oT2, and whose second entry is (a description of) the set {0, 1} n. This way, if the same formula is considered twice, the same random n-bit string would be selected. Then the prover computes a random, first auxiliary pair (x0, Y0) (again using the random selector so that it could recompute the same pair whenever it wanted to). Then, for i 0,-.., n, the auxiliary pairs (XOb...bO, YOb...biO), (XObl...bl, YOb...bI), are chosen by the random selector on input 0b... bi0 and 0b... bil, respectively. The pair associated with (I) is (xob...b, YObl...b).
We now proceed more formally.
Description of (P,V).
"a 4e, where e is the constant of reduction CR. Select is P's random selector.
PAIR(n) is the set of pairs (x, y) such that x e Bn(n) and y e NQRx."
Input to P and V:
A random string a, a poT %, where IPl 8n3, ITI 2ha and I%1 2n4. 6.2. (P,V) is a noninteractive proof system for 3SAT. The proof system (P, V) of 5 constitutes the main building block of the just-described sender-receiver pair (P, Y). Therefore, the completeness of (P, V) can be easily derived from the analysis of completeness in 5.2.
Let us now focus our attention on the soundness. We shall show that, if the formula (I) is not 3-satisfiable, then for any Turing machine Adversary (even a "cheating" one that chooses (I) after seeing the reference string), V will accept the proof provided by Adversary with sufficiently low probability. The proof closely follows the reasoning done in 5.2 to prove the soundness of the proof system (P, V) described in 5.1. We distinguish two cases:
1. For some w, (xw, yw) AfQT(2n). 2. All the pairs (x, y) belong to AfQT(2n) but 3SAT.
If (Xo, Yo) AfQT(2n), we are in the very same situation analyzed in case (a) in the proof of soundness of 5.2. By the same reasoning, we conclude that the verification of step 1 is passed with sufficiently low probability. Suppose that for w sb, where b E {0, 1}, (x,y) AfQT(2n), and (xw,y) AfQ(2n). Then, 3SAT and therefore the procedure Check_Prove invoked for returns REJECT with sufciently high probability.
Now, suppose that all pairs (x, y) belong to AfQT(2n) but 3SAT. Since (xs,ys) e AfQT(2n), s 5o51.. "bn, following the reasoning done for cases (b) and (c) in the proof of soundness in 5.2, we conclude that verification step V.3 is passed with very low probability. Now, we show that the proof system (P, V) is also zero-knowledge over 3SAT.
6.3. The simulator. In this section, we describe an efficient algorithm S; in the next section we will prove that, on input of a sequence of 3-satisfiable formulae, S's output cannot, under the QRA, be distinguished from V's view by any efficient nonuniform algorithm.
S's Program
Input: An integer n > 0. A sequence 1, (1)2, of 3-satisfiable formulae with n clauses each. 0. Set Sire_Output empty string and Tree empty set. The random variable output by S is certainly different from View and, before proceeding any further, let us compare them. In View the string p is truly random, while the corresponding string p constructed by S does not contain any element in NQR%. In View, each y is a quadratic nonresidue modulo the corresponding x, 1 1 1 1 whereas in S, yl is chosen among the quadratic residues modulo xs. Because of the different quadratic residuosity of the y's, the two distributions differ also in the 's and in the strings Proofq2 and ProofO. In fact, the formula s is satisfiable if and only if both (xs0, ys0) and (xl, ysl) are of the prescribed form. This is certainly the case in View. But in S, as all ys's are quadratic residues, none of the pairs (xs, y) is of the prescribed form and therefore none of the 8's is satisfiable. Moreover, the y's are also used to compute the labeling of the literals in the strings Proofs'S and ProofO's and thus in S all literals are labeled with quadratic nonresidues.
In the next section, we shall prove, using a reasoning similar to the one in Section 5.3 that, despite the differences described above, the two families of random variables cannot be distinguished by any efficient nonuniform algorithm, under the QRA. 6.4. (P,V) is zero-knowledge. THEOREM 6.3. Under the QRA, the sender-receiver pair (P, V) of 6.1 is a noninteractive ZKPS.
Proof. All that is left to prove is that (P, V) satisfies the zero-knowledge condition.
We do this by showing that the output of algorithm S of the previous section cannot be distinguished from the view of the verifier V by any efficient nonuniform algorithm.
We proceed by contradiction. Assume that there exists a constant d > 0, an infinite subset 27 c_ Af, a As we have seen in the last section, the main difference between S's output and the view of the verifier is in the ys's: they are all quadratic residues modulo the corresponding x's in S's output, while they are all quadratic nonresidues in View. We will now describe an efficient nonuniform algorithm C {Cn}n:Y. Each Cn takes two inputs: j _> 0 and (x,y) PAIR(n) {(u,v) u BL(n),v J+}; and has "wired-in" the formulae O, n "", R(n) along with their lexicographically smaller satisfying assignments. Roughly speaking, Cn produces as output a "random" string and "proofs" for all formulae O's. Cn selects the input pair (x, y) as the jth auxiliary pair. All prior pairs are selected as simulator S does and all subsequent pairs as prover P does. Thus, Cn "knows" the factorization of the Blum modulus for all auxiliary pairs except (x, y). Nonetheless, algorithm Cn will use (x, y) as S would if y QRx, and as P would if y NQRx. More formally, Cn is designed so as to enjoy the following properties. Set Space(n, j, QR) {x BL(n); y -QR; s Cn (j, X, y) S}, Space(n,j, NQR) {x -BL(n); y -NQRx; s -Cn(j,x,y) s}.
Then, Property, (1) Space(n, O, NQR) View(n, O,..., O(,)), })roperty (2) Space(n, nR(n) + 1, QR) {s 2-S(1n, O, onR(n)) 8}, Property (3) Space(n, j, QR) Space(n, j + 1, NQR). From these properties we will conclude that the existence of D violates the QRA. We now formally describe the algorithm, and then prove all the stated properties.
The Algorithm Cn "Cn has "wired-in" the R(n)-tuple ((I) n R(n)) and, for each e ((I) OR(n)}, the lexicographically smaller satisfying assignment t."
Input: "An integer j e [0, nR(n)+ 1]. A pair (x, y) e PAIR(n)." 1. "Choose p and choose and certify first auxiliary pair."
Ifj 0 then set x
x and Yo Y. Else randomly select two n-bit primes Po, qo 3 mod 4, set x Po qo, and select Yo E QRx Execute procedure Gen_p_and_Proof l(Xo, Yo), thus obtaining p and Proofo.
2. "Choose other auxiliary pairs." "Tree contains the indices of auxiliary pairs that are used to certify two others auxiliary pairs. Count contains the number of all selected auxiliary pairs." Set Tree empty set and Count 1. Output:(p -1 T., PROOF).
First note that {Cn}ne: is an efficient nonuniform algorithm. All xs's (except the jth) are selected along with their prime factors and thus all related computations can be performed in expected polynomial time. All operations concerning x and y are simple multiplications and testing of membership in J+. The size of the set Tree is never bigger than nR(n), and thus membership and add operations are easily performed.
The strings T and T constructed by Cn are random. Indeed, either they are randomly selected or they are generated by Sample_T_Proof9-. The analysis in 5.4
shows that in the latter case the resulting string T is random.
Proof of )ropert, (1). Assume j 0 and y NQR. All ys's are quadratic nonresidues in Cn'S output. (x, y) is set equal to (Xo, Yo) and used twice: at step 1 to produce p and Proofo and at step 3 to construct Proof Both the strings Proofo and Proofo have the same probability of being chosen as in View when the first BLUM, DE SANTIS, MICALI, AND PERSIANO pair is (x0, Yo). From Lemma 5.3, each string p is equally likely to be constructed at step 1. Thus, Space(n, O, NQR) View(n, 0 n R(n))" Proof of Property (2). Suppose j nR(n) + 1. To prove R(n) formulae, at most nR(n) auxiliary pairs are needed. Thus, each Y8 constructed by Cn belongs to QRx. All the strings Proof8's and ProofO's are constructed in exactly the same way, both by S and by Ca. Hence, Space(n, uP(n)+ 1, QR) {s 2-S(1 n Proof of eoperty (3). Consider now the two probability spaces Space(n,j, QR) and Space(n, j + 1, NQR). In both spaces the auxiliary pairs are randomly chosen so that the first j y's are quadratic residues modulo the corresponding x's and, from the (j + 1)st on, all the y's are quadratic nonresidues. All computations concerning pairs (x, ys) different from (x, y) are performed in the same way. The pair (x, y) is used to construct either a proof Proofq2 for a formula derived from a reduction or a proof ProofO for one of the formulae O, or is never used. In the former two cases the proof is generated using the procedure Samp:[e_T_and_Proof2. When y NQRx (y QR), this procedure returns a string Proof that has the same distribution as if it where generated by the procedure Prove (gen__Proof2). Thus, Space(n, j, QR) Space(n, j + 1, NQR).
We now conclude the proof of Theorem 6.3. We have assumed that D distin- (1) and (2), then, this is tantamount to saying that D distinguishes between Space(n, 0, NQR) and Space(n, uP(n)+ 1, QR). By the pigeon-hole principle, and because of Property (3), for all nthere exists j j(n), 0 <_ j <_ uP(n) + 1, such that D distinguishes between Space(n,j, QR) and Space(n,j, NQR). That is, for all n ', IPj(n, QR)-Pj(n, NQR)I >_ 1/((nR(n) + 2)nd)
where Pj(n, QR) Pr(s Space(n,j, QR) Dn(s) 1) and Py(n, NQR) Space(n,j, NQR) On(S) 1). Thus, composing each Cn(j(n),',') with On, one obtains an efficient nonuniform algorithm that violates the QRA. 6.5. Proving theorems of arbitrary size. Given a reference string of 8n 3 2n + 2n 4 bit, the proof system (P, V) of 6.1 can be used to prove in zero-knowledge the 3-satisfiability of an arbitrary number of 3-satisfiable formulae, but each of them must have at most n clauses. However, the same proof system can be used to prove 3-satisfiable formulae with any number of clauses. The idea is perhaps best conveyed in an informal manner. Given a formula with k clauses, the prover computes certified auxiliary pair (x , y) and the lexicographicMly smaller satisfying assignment t for O. To label each literal uj of the prover randomly selects rj Z and, if 2y,I, mod x t(uj) 1 he associates with uj the label wy rj otherwise the label wj rj2 mod x . The label associated with j is wjyOmod x literal has an element in NQR as label if and only if it is made true by t. To prove that 3SAT, the prover proves that each clause has at least an element of NQR among the labels of its three literMs. That is, consider the language L {(yl,y2, Y3,X): at least one of Yl,Y2,Y3 belongs to NQR}. Then L NP and therefore there exists a fixed polynomial-time computable reduction RED such that 0' RED(y, Y2, Y3, x) 3SATns == (y, Y2, Y3, x) L, where f is a fixed constant depending only on RED. Therefore, to prove that the ith clause is satisfied, the prover computes the formula Oi using the reduction RED and proves that Oi E 3SAT. By the property of the reduction the length of the formula is upper bounded by n f and can thus be proved 3-satisfiable using the previously described proof system (P, V) with a reference string of 8n 3f + 2n sl + 2n 42 bits. Therefore, we have reduced the problem of proving the 3-satisfiability of one formula with many clauses to that of proving the 3-satisfiability of many formulae, each with at most n clauses. 6.6. Efficient provers. In the proof system of 6.1, for convenience of presentation, the prover P was made quite powerful. For instance, P needs to find the lexicographically first satisfying assignment of a formula for proving that it is in 3SAT. This, however, is not necessary. It is easily seen that, under the QRA, the verifier would obtain an undistinguishable view [GoMiRa] , no matter which satisfying assignment the prover may use. Also, it is possible for the prover to have access to a random oracle instead of a random selector and still generate essentially the same view to a polynomial-time verifier. In fact, by well-known techniques, a random oracle can be transformed to a random function associating each string with a a "polynomially longer" random string. This random string may be used to select the necessary primes and quadratic residues and nonresidues with essentially the same odds as for a random selector. Actually, if one replaces a random oracle with a polyrandom function as in Goldreich, Goldwasser, and Micali [GoGoMi] , the view of the verifier would still be indistinguishable from the one it obtains from P. These functions exist under the QRA 12 and the replacement only entails that the same short, randomly selected string should be remembered throughout the proving process.
In sum, the prover may very well be polynomial time, as long as it is given satisfying assignments for the formulae that need to be proved satisfiable in noninteractive zero knowledge. This is an important point, and can be shown to hold not only for our specific noninteractive ZKPS, but also for any other that shares our algorithmic structure.
Since, however, systems with a different structure and relying on weaker intractability assumptions have already been found (see below), we decline to formalize this point in our paper. Our goal, at this point, is making precise the notion of noninteractive zero-knowledge and showing its feasibility.
Recent improvements and related works.
Two main open problems were posed in [DeMiPel] , namely, 1. whether many provers could share the same random string and 13 2. whether it is possible to implement noninteractive zero-knowledge with a general complexity assumption, rather than on our specific number-theoretic one.
Recently, both our questions have been solved in a beautiful paper by Feige, Lapidot, and Shamir [FeLaSh] . They show that any number of provers can share the same random string and that any trap-door permutation can be used instead of quadratic residuosity. They also show that one-way permutations are sufficient for bounded noninteractive zero-knowledge, but the prover needs to have exponential computing power. Our first question was also independently solved by De Santis and Yung [DeYu] .
Noninteractive zero-knowledge has been shown to yield a new paradigm for digital signature schemes by Bellare and Goldwasser [BeGo] . De Santis, Micali, and Persiano [DeMiPe2] show that, if any one-way function exists, after an interactive preprocessing stage, any "sufficiently short" theorem can be proven noninteractively and in zero-knowledge.
Kilian, Micali, and Ostrovsky [KiMiOs] have shown that, if any one-way function exists, after a preprocessing stage consisting of a "few" executions of an oblivious transfer protocol, any theorem can be proven in zero knowledge and noninteractively.
(Namely, after executing O(k) oblivious transfers, the probability of accepting a false theorem is 1 in 2k.) Bellare and Micali [BeMi] show that, based on a complexity assumption, it is possible to build public-key cryptosystems in which oblivious transfer is itself implementable without any interaction.
A general open problem.
An obvious open problem in noninteractive zeroknowledge consists of finding more efficient proof systems. However, in our opinion, a more important one is decreasing the needed complexity assumption. This effort should be extended to all of cryptography at this point in its development.
Introducing new cryptographic primitives is crucial, but would be essentially impossible without first relying on some special, though hopefully well studied, complexity assumptions. It is important, though, to later find the minimal assumptions for implementing these primitives. In fact, "extra structure" may make proving that the desired property holds easier, but may also force the underlying complexity assumption to be false. Personally, Micali finds a dramatic difference between one-way functions and one-way permutations. (Breaking a glass is quite easy. Putting it back together is certainly harder, but what if we were guaranteed that there is a unique way to do so?)
We believe noninteractive zero-knowledge to be a fundamental primitive, one deserving the effort to establish the minimal assumptions needed for it to be securely implemented. We thus hope the following question will be settled: If one-way functions exist, does 3SAT have noninteractive zero-knowledge proof systems whose prover, given the proper witness, needs only to work in polynomial time? 9. Acknowledgments. We wholeheartedly thank Mihir Bellare for his constructive and generous criticism throughout this research.
Many thanks to Shaft Goldwasser and Mike Sipser for their encouraging support, technical and spiritual. (Make it also financial next time!)
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